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From the Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins Era to 
the New Millennium: 130 Years of Family Law 
Susan Frelich Appleton* 
Lest you worry from the title that this review will itself take 130 
years, let me explain that I plan to present three brief snapshots. Each 
snapshot depicts a distinct period in the evolution of family law, and I 
have given each snapshot its own “caption” to help convey what the 
picture is all about. The snapshots focus on 1869, the year that marks 
the admission to law school of Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe 
Couzins, among the nation’s first women law students; 1975, the year 
when I began teaching at Washington University School of Law; and 
Spring 2000, the semester we are just completing and the beginning, 
depending upon your definition, of the new millennium. 
I. 1869: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE FAMILY 
Washington University had no women students and no courses on 
family law when it opened its Law Department in 1867. Perhaps 
serendipitously, given our celebration today, two changes happened 
concurrently in 1869. First, Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins 
enrolled as the school’s—and perhaps the nation’s—first women law 
students.1 Second, the Honorable Samuel Reber, who taught “History 
 
 * Associate Dean of Faculty and Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins Professor of 
Law. This Article is a slightly revised version of an address delivered by the author on April 21, 
2000, on the occasion of her installation as the Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins Professor 
of Law. To the extent that issues raised in the address reached some resolution after April 21, I 
have added appropriate updating in footnotes.  
 In addition to those whom I thanked at the installation ceremony, including my family, I 
now thank Martha Chamallas, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
and John S. Lehmann Distinguished Visiting Professor at Washington University School of 
Law during spring 2000, for insightful suggestions that helped me improve the original address 
and, in turn, this Article. 
 1. Cartus Rhey Williams, History of the Law Department of Washington University (The 
St. Louis Law School) 1867-1900, at 106 (1942) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, Washington 
University). Williams explains that “Miss Couzins and Miss Barkaloo [sic] may have entered 
the Law School at the same time as Miss [Ada] Kepley, who, nevertheless, maintains the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and Science of Law; Equity, and Law of Successions,”2 was 
instructed at a faculty meeting “to devote whatever spare time he 
might have to the subject of domestic relations.”3 True, family law 
was not a full-fledged course in the curriculum, but it had gained a 
toehold. 
What might family law—or “domestic relations”—have 
encompassed in 1869? We might assume that issues of marriage, 
support, divorce, and adoption predominated; yet the legal structures 
underlying some of these practices were just then beginning to 
emerge. Domestic relations in 1869 also would have included the law 
of “master and servant,” presenting some interesting questions in this 
period so soon after the Civil War had ended slavery.4 If we take 
today’s understanding of family law and turn the clock back to 1869, 
 
distinction of being the first woman to receive the LL.B. degree,” which she obtained from the 
Union College of Law, “a department of the old University of Chicago, but later affiliated with 
Northwestern University.” See Leila J. Robinson, Women Lawyers in the United States, 2 THE 
GREEN BAG 10, 13 (1890) (citing enrollment of Barkeloo and Couzins in 1869 while naming 
Kepley as first woman to earn “a degree for a regular course of legal study,” but failing to 
indicate when Kepley entered law school); Karen L. Tokarz, Commemoration, A Tribute to the 
Nation’s First Women Law Students,  68 WASH . U. L.Q. 89, 90 (1990) (citing KAREN 
MORELLO, T HE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT 
(1986) (describing Barkeloo as “the nation’s first woman law student”)). 
 2. A CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICERS AND STUDENTS OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY FOR 
THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1869-70, at 46 (1870). An irresistible aside: Examining this catalogue 
gave me a special thrill because of the tangible reminder that Mary Institute, the single-sex 
school that I attended for fourteen years, from “Junior Kindergarten” through high school, had 
originally been a part of Washington University. The University established Mary Institute in 
1859 in response to the absence in St. Louis of schools that women could attend to prepare for 
college:  
The Institute is provided with the most thorough and varied instruction, so that  no 
citizen of St. Louis need send his daughter a thousand miles away from home, for four 
or five of the most critical years of her life, to be trained by strangers. 
 The connection of the [Female] Seminary with the University will be only such as to 
secure to the young ladies all the means of high intellectual culture accessible to young 
men . . .. 
Id. at 52. See also  Arthur Newell Chamberlin III, Mary Institute: The Story of a Hundred Years, 
in FROM MARY TO YOU: CENTENNIAL 1859-1959, at 7, 8-20 (1959). Despite the University’s 
pipeline for women students prepared for a college education, “coeducation in the Law 
Department [of Washington University] preceeded [sic] coeducation in the College.” Williams, 
supra  note 1, at 107. 
 3. See Williams, supra  note 1, at 117 (citing MINUTES OF THE FACULTY OF THE LAW 
DEPARTMENT, 1867-1935, at 31). 
 4. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1297, 1299, 1319, 1389-91 (1998). 
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however, a number of salient points emerge, emphasizing just how 
far ahead of their time Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins must 
have been. 
The Catalogue outlining the course of instruction for 1869-70 in 
Washington University’s Law Department lists Blackstone’s 
Commentaries as one of several required texts for the “Junior” or 
entering class.5 Today’s family law students, of course, know 
Blackstone best for his articulation of the legal nonexistence of 
married women. As Blackstone wrote: “By marriage, the husband 
and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least 
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband . . . .”6 Each 
spouse had a well defined role under the law, making the husband 
responsible for support and the wife for domestic services.7  
This common-law concept of marriage also authorized domestic 
violence which today, unfortunately, provides much work for our 
students in the Civil Justice Clinic. As Blackstone described: 
The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife 
moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her 
misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with 
this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the 
same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants 
or children . . . .8 
 
 5. See A CATALOGUE OF THE OFFICERS AND STUDENTS OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1868-69, at 50 (1869) (specifying “Blackstone’s Commentaries 
(Sharswood), Books I., II., III.” among the “text books [that] will be used by the Junior Class 
during the next term (1869-70).”). 
 6. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, *442. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. at *444 (footnote omitted). Is it an overstatement to say in text that Blackstone’s 
concept of marriage authorized domestic violence? True, Blackstone referred to “the old law” 
and used the word “moderation.” He added that “with us, in the politer reign of Charles the 
Second, this power of correction began to be doubted.” Id. at *445. Nonetheless, this section 
concludes with the following observation: “Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond 
of the old common law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege: and the courts of law will 
still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehaviour.” Id. 
See also  Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2129-30, 2153 (1996) (stating that although the husband’s prerogative to 
chastise his wife was abolished by the 1870s, laws continued to condone violence in marriage 
through other doctrines, including marital privacy). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Note that Blackstone’s understanding of marriage not only made 
physical force a legitimate part of a husband’s role but also ensured 
that a wife or a child on the receiving end of such force could not turn 
to law enforcement for help.9 
Just four years after Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins 
became law students, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
Illinois’ denial of Myra Bradwell’s application to practice law.10 The 
famous concurring opinion by Justice Bradley offers a telling portrait 
of the law’s approach to family life at that time.11 Justice Bradley’s 
opinion provides the classic description of the “separate spheres” 
occupied by each sex during an era when the world of commerce and 
ideas belonged exclusively to men and the “cult of domesticity” 
celebrated women’s roles as “nurturing mothers and submissive 
wives.”12 In explaining why Mrs. Bradwell had no right to practice 
law, Justice Bradley wrote: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always 
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and 
destinies of man and woman . . .. The natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The 
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the 
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates 
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the 
domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say 
identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, 
to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman 
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband. 13  
 
 9. See, e.g., Raymond I. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 
WIS. L. REV. 914, 930-31; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth Schneider, Women’s Subordination and 
the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 154-57 (David 
Kairys ed., revised ed. 1990). 
 10. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 11. See id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 12. Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:” Toward a History of 
Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 866. 
 13. 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/8
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The opinion invoked biology as destiny, called on religion for 
reinforcement, and treated the Blackstone understanding of marriage 
as immutable.14  
Justice Bradley went on to note that exceptions to the 
stereotype—exemplified by women like Lemma Barkeloo and 
Phoebe Couzins, who never married—did not justify different 
treatment: 
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by 
any of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of 
the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. 
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of 
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to 
the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon 
exceptional cases.15 
A number of modern scholars challenge the traditional story of 
how family law evolved. They question whether the “separate 
spheres” ideology accurately captures the actual experiences of 
women (and men) of the nineteenth century.16 Indeed, we know that 
some young women worked outside the home, particularly women of 
color and working-class women.17 In addition, many women, 
including African-Americans, joined voluntary associations that 
ultimately became instrumental in legal reforms related to the family, 
including juvenile courts, welfare programs, and birth control. 18 Yet, 
even if Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins led lives that did not 
 
 14. See id.; see also  Minow, supra  note 12, at 843. 
 15. 83 U.S. at 141-42. 
 16. See generally Minow, supra  note 12; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family 
Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1163-74 (pointing out the difficulty of identifying “any objective 
sense in which the family is a private domain” and asking whether “private” and “public” more 
properly refer to social circumstances or perspective based on different ways of experiencing 
the world). 
 17. See JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE , LABOR OF SORROW:  BLACK WOMEN, 
WORK , AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985); Minow, supra  note 12, at 
869-75. 
 18. See LINDA GORDON,  PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE 
HISTORY OF WELFARE , 1890-1935 (1994), at 111-43; Minow, supra note 12, at 877-82; 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE , REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING 
OF LIBERTY  82 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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conform to the conventional regime, they nonetheless would have 
studied Blackstone’s version of reality in law school. If experience 
counts most, then try to imagine the experience of a woman studying 
legal rules that explicitly subordinate all women. 
Although marriage might have had its drawbacks in this era, 
forming a family without marriage posed even greater risks. 
Fornication and nonmarital cohabitation constituted crimes.19 
Children born outside of marriage suffered not just social stigma, but 
real legal disabilities including the absence of any right to inheritance 
or support from their fathers.20 Legislative efforts to limit family 
forms did not always prove successful, however. For example, 
Congress had outlawed bigamy in the territories in 1862, but 
polygamy continued to thrive among Mormons in Utah.21 
The Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins era was also the period 
in which childbearing became compulsory, at least in the eyes of the 
law. Before then, abortions early in pregnancy had long been 
commonplace and without legal consequence—indeed, newspapers 
and ladies’ magazines openly advertised such remedies and 
services.22 The second half of the nineteenth century, however, 
witnessed a dramatic change in the law. Laws against contraception 
were enacted,23 and many states made abortion, even early abortion, a 
crime. Historians have offered two explanations for the change. First, 
physicians, seeking to upgrade their professional status, undertook to 
ban the services performed by their competitors such as midwives, 
abortion-providers, and other “irregular” practitioners.24 Second, the 
 
 19. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.6 at 430 (Note on Adultery 
and Fornication) (1980) (“At one time or another, most American states extended their penal 
laws to reach such misconduct, but the trend in this century has been toward decriminalization 
or reduction in penalties.”). 
 20. MICHAEL GROSSBERG , GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 196-233 (1985). See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE , 
ILLEGITIMACY : LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY  (1971). See also  I  BLACKSTONE, supra  note 6, at 
*459. 
 21. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 168 (1878). Utah banned 
polygamy in 1894, in response to a condition mandated by Congress for admission into the 
Union. See United States Statutes at Large, 53 Cong. Ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). 
 22. JAMES C. MOHR,  ABORTION IN AMERICA :  THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF 
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, 51-57 (1978). 
 23. GROSSBERG, supra  note 20, at 156-95. 
 24. See, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER,  ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 20-35 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/8
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influx of immigrants into the United States—who were usually both 
poor and fertile—prompted fears of “race suicide,” providing an 
impetus to stop white, middle -class women from limiting family 
size.25 The emergence of criminal abortion prohibitions (almost 
always aimed at abortion providers and not women) certainly 
reinforced the rigid gender-based roles within the family that Justice 
Bradley described in Bradwell.26 
Formal adoption laws made their debut around 1869, with the first 
comprehensive American adoption statute enacted by Massachusetts 
in 1851.27 Missouri enacted its first adoption statute in 1857, and 
New York did so in 1873. 28 Although something akin to adoption had 
occurred in earlier times through the practices of apprenticeship and 
“placing out,” the 1851 Massachusetts statute initiated a legislative 
trend, in turn sparking the establishment of Children’s Aid Societies 
and other private agencies designed to place young children in homes 
with families willing to rear them.29 
Yet on other matters of child welfare, the law in 1869 remained 
completely undeveloped. To find a basis for legal intervention in a 
case of horrible child abuse that occurred in the early 1870s, a 
creative social worker sought the assistance of the American Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals on the theory that the child 
was a member of the animal kingdom.30 
For many, the law of domestic relations means divorce law: the 
bases for dissolving a marriage and the rules for resolving all the 
issues arising in the wake of a dissolution, including property 
division, alimony, child custody, and child support. The time when 
Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins began law school marked a 
watershed for divorce law. According to legal historian Lawrence 
Friedman, many states enacted highly permissive divorce laws 
 
(1984); MOHR, supra note 22, at 147-70. 
 25. MOHR, supra  note 22, at 86-118, 128. See LINDA GORDON,  WOMAN’S BODY, 
WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 136-58 (1976). 
 26. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
 27. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption , 11 
J. FAM. L. 443, 465 (1971). 
 28.  See id. at 466 nn.111-12. 
 29. See id. at 473-74. 
 30. Peter Stevens & Marian Eide, The First Chapter of Children’s Rights, 41 AM. 
HERITAGE 84 (1990). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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between 1850 and 1870; yet, around 1870 the tide turned with fears 
that “easy divorce” would cause the downfall of America just as it 
had for the Roman Empire.31  
II. 1975: EQUALITY WITHIN THE FAMILY 
In this very personal chronicle of family law, the next milestone is 
1975, when I arrived here as an assistant professor of law after 
completing my clerkship with Judge Webster on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.32 I asked to teach family law 
as one of my courses. I had fallen in love with the subject matter as a 
law student in 1971 or 1972 in Berkeley, where my mentor, Professor 
Herma Hill Kay,33 introduced me to this field. Phil Shelton,34 my co-
clerk during my first year with Judge Webster, taught family law as a 
visiting professor at Washington University in 1974, and he appeared 
only too willing to unload this often disfavored course. Indeed, 
Professor Martha Minow from Harvard has written about family 
law’s low status within the profession,35 and Professor Sylvia Law of 
New York University has observed that, among teachers and 
scholars, constitutional law is King and family law is Cinderella.36 
Yet, I certainly did not feel that any wicked stepsisters had 
conscripted me to a life of drudgery and misery! 
Not surprisingly, much had changed since 1869, when family law 
 
 31. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 498-99 (2d ed. 1985). 
 32. The Honorable William H. Webster sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit (1973-78) and subsequently served as Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (1978-87) and Director of Central Intelligence (1987-91). He then became a 
partner at the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. 
 33. Professor Kay served as Dean at Boalt Hall (the University of California at Berkeley 
School of Law) from 1992-2000, and during that time she assumed a chaired position named 
for an earlier member of the Boalt faculty, Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong. In 1922, Armstrong 
became “first woman law professor appointed to a tenure-track position in an American Bar 
Association (ABA)-approved, AALS-member school.” Herma Hill Kay, The Future of Women 
Law Professors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 5, 5-6 (1991). 
 34. Philip D. Shelton subsequently served as Washington University School of Law’s 
Associate Dean (1975-85) and its Acting Dean (1985-87), departing to become Dean at the 
Walter F. George School of Law at Mercer University. In 1993, he became President and 
Executive Director of the Law School Admissions Council. 
 35. Minow, supra  note 12, at 819. 
 36. Sylvia A. Law, Speech at the Washington University School of Law Public Interest 
Law Speakers Series (Mar. 22, 2000). 
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first crept into the curriculum at this law school. Just two years before 
I began teaching, the United States Supreme Court had decided Roe 
v. Wade,37 which—to borrow from Sylvia Law once again—is the 
most important thing the Supreme Court has ever done for women.38 
Roe challenged the notion that biology determines destiny and it gave 
every woman the opportunity to decide her own place in society, her 
own role in her family, and of course her own health care. With 
childbearing a choice rather than an inevitability, motherhood 
acquired new value.39 
At this same time, following the enactment of California’s path-
breaking law in 1969,40 no-fault divorce became a legal reality and 
changed not only the way families dissolve but also our 
understanding of marriage.41 Again, enhanced social value followed, 
once staying married became a choice.42 The choice broadened as the 
Supreme Court cleared away most of the previously existing 
discriminations against children born outside of marriage 43 and as 
other courts began fashioning remedies designed to achieve fairness 
at the end of nonmarital relationships. California led the way in this 
area too, with its supreme court’s famous 1976 decision in Marvin v. 
Marvin ,44 which imposed financial responsibilities on cohabitants 
after the relationship ends. 
Domestic violence was just beginning to emerge from the 
shadows, but I cannot recall spending a moment on the subject in my 
early classes. Many states still adhered to the doctrine of spousal 
 
 37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 38. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 981 
(1984). 
 39. See, e.g., BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN,  RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 107 (1989). 
 40. See CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 2310, 2311, 2335 (West 1994) (formerly in California 
Civil Code §§ 4506, 4507, 4509). 
 41. See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No -Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform , in 
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6-11 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 
1990). 
 42. See ROTHMAN, supra note 39. Cf. Kay, supra note 41, at 10 (noting a new 
understanding of marriage that elevates self-interest). 
 43. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 
U.S. 164 (1972); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); see also  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972) (requiring notice and a hearing before children of some unmarried fathers become 
wards of the state). 
 44. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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immunity,45 and the crime of rape contained an explicit exemption for 
husbands.46 Nonetheless, one student in my first family law class, 
Nina Balsam, soon thereafter co-authored Missouri’s Adult Abuse 
Act.47 
All of the issues I have addressed—reproductive freedom, 
divorce, cohabitation, and domestic violence—have a common, 
though perhaps implicit, core: family law’s changing treatment of 
women and their roles: a fitting theme to emphasize in honor of 
Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins. Nonetheless, I have not yet 
mentioned the very explicit ways in which this theme pervaded 
family law discourse in the mid-1970s.  
The mid-1970s was the time when proponents of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA)—which Congress passed in 1972—held high 
hopes for ratification by the states;48 when Phyllis Schlafly, the most 
high-profile opponent of the ERA, was a law student here in some of 
my classes;49 and when, even without the ERA, the Supreme Court 
began to hold unconstitutional many examples of sex-based 
discrimination, including gender-specific family laws.50  
Legal challenges to traditional gender-based family laws also 
drew strength from science and medicine during this period. One 
such contribution deserves special mention: an excerpt from Man and 
Woman, Boy and Girl by John Money and Anke Ehrhard was 
featured in one of the leading family law casebooks of this period.51 
 
 45. Missouri did not abolish the doctrine of interspousal immunity until 1986. See S.A.V. 
v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986). 
 46. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that exemption 
violates equal protection). 
 47. MO.  REV.  STAT. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1994 & Cum. Supp. 1999). See Steven J. 
Givens, Opening Doors for Domestic Violence Victims, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 
LAW MAGAZINE, Fall, 1997, at 12 (profile of Nina Balsam, class of 1976). 
 48. See, e.g., Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional 
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 893 (1971). 
 49. Phyllis Schlafly, president of the conservative Eagle Forum, enrolled at Washington 
University as a first-year student in 1975 and received her J.D. in 1978. 
 50. See, e.g ., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
(1975); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). This development resulted from the meticulous 
advocacy of attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who in her current role as Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court will visit us in 2001 as Jurist in Residence. 
 51. John Money & Anke Ehrhardt, Man and Woman, Boy and Girl: The Differentiation 
and Dimorphism of Gender Identity from Conception to Maturity 118-23 (1972), in JUDITH 
AREEN,  CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 30-33 (1978). See also  JUDITH AREEN, 
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The excerpt recounted the story of an infant boy who had suffered a 
serious injury during circumcision. His parents sought medical advice 
and ultimately found their way to experts who counseled them to 
raise their son as a daughter. The scientific literature went on to 
report that these efforts succeeded and that the child—treated as a girl 
by parents and others—actually became one, and a happy and healthy 
girl at that. Hundreds of family law students studied this case in 
successive editions of Dean Judith Areen’s family law casebook,52 
which I and many other teachers assigned in our courses over the 
years. The message for family law was clear: Gender is entirely a 
social construct. If—with the right conditioning—anyone can be a 
male, and anyone can be a female, then the foundation of the separate 
spheres for men and women crumbles. Gender-based legal rules 
governing the family become little more than reflections of cultural 
and social stereotypes.53 With such scientific support, we could 
comfortably predict that family law of the future would look 
increasingly gender neutral. 
III. 2000: DIVERSITY AND MULTIPLICITY 
In my final snapshot, the current semester’s family law students, 
the first of the new millennium, had the opportunity to see how this 
prediction of increasing gender neutrality has played out. Four 
important cases competed for national attention as the year began—
not counting the controversy about Elian Gonzalez. 54 
 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 24-26 (2d ed. 1985); JUDITH AREEN,  CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 30-33 (3d ed. 1992). But see JUDITH AREEN,  CASES AND 
MATERIALS: FAMILY LAW 46 (4th ed. 1999). 
 52. See supra note 51. 
 53. The Supreme Court often has condemned the “archaic and stereotypic notions” 
underlying the laws it has invalidated as unconstitutional gender classifications. See, e.g., 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197-99 (1976). 
 54. I could not discuss the Elian Gonzalez controversy on the merits in my address 
because my mother and I so vehemently disagree! My mother, who contends Elian should have 
been permitted to remain in the United States, still has not accepted my conventional family-
law arguments that parental autonomy gave Elian’s father the authority to make important 
decisions for his young son, including the decision to return to Cuba. 
 Another irresistible aside: I learned later that, precisely as I was giving the address on 
which this essay is based, the dean who brought me to Washington University School of Law, 
Edward T. Foote (now President of the University of Miami), was participating in negotiations 
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First, the Vermont Supreme Court had just ruled that reserving 
marriage and all its benefits for male -female couples, without 
providing equal opportunities for same-sex couples, violates the state 
constitution. 55 In response to the court’s directive, the Vermont 
legislature is currently working to develop a special regime—a 
legally recognized civil union—for same-sex couples, who will not 
be able to say that they are “married” but will be eligible for all of the 
other benefits that the law gives to married couples.56 Under one 
reading, this case marks yet another challenge to our traditional 
understanding of what it means to be a husband and what it means to 
be a wife.57 
Second, we await a decision from the United States Supreme 
Court in a Washington case publicized as a challenge to 
“grandparents’ visitation rights.”58 A close look at the statute in 
question, however, shows that much more is at stake, including 
whether other persons without the legal status of parents can petition 
for visitation with a child. 59 This broader question shares a 
connection with the Vermont Supreme Court case: As families and 
couples take on more diverse forms, there will be a variety of adults 
 
between Elian’s father and the Miami relatives. A few hours later, the INS raided the Miami 
relatives’ home to return Elian to his father’s custody. Lizette Alvarez, The Elian Gonzalez 
Case: The Overview, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 24, 2000, at A1.  
 55. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the benefits and protections that laws provide to married couples violates the Common 
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution). 
 56. Vermont House Bill 847 was signed by the Governor on April 26, 2000, and became 
effective July 1. See 2000 VT. Acts & Resolves 91. 
 57. I should add that the American Law Institute project on which I have worked for 
several years, the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, was a step ahead of the 
developments in Vermont. This blueprint for family law reform spells out comparable rules for 
the dissolution of both traditional marriages and nontraditional families, including same-sex 
couples. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ,  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4 2000). The Institute gave its final 
approval to this project at the Annual Meeting in May 2000. Since 1994, I served as one of the 
advisers to the Principles. 
 58. In Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), decided June 5, a splintered Court 
produced six different opinions, ultimately invalidating the third-party visitation statute as 
applied in this case. The different approaches exemplified in the opinions leave open many 
questions about the constitutional limits on such family laws. 
 59. WASH . REV. CODE  § 26.10.160(3) (1994). The Washington statute permits any person 
to petition the court for visitation at any time under any circumstances. See 120 S. Ct. at 2057-
58 (plurality opinion). 
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who will function as a child’s parent and for whom maintaining 
contact through visitation would serve the child’s best interests.60 In 
the coming years, family law must face the difficult challenge of 
finding a way to safeguard such nontraditional relationships without 
unduly infringing parental autonomy. 
Third, we await a decision from the United States Supreme Court 
about whether violence against women, including domestic violence, 
has achieved recognition as a problem of sufficient national 
dimension to justify a federal law on the subject.61 The questions of 
diversity or multiplicity that arise here do not concern family forms; 
rather, these questions center on the appropriate sources of family 
law. Does family law belong exclusively to the states, as we often 
read?62 To what extent do “the feds” have authority to make family 
law?63 Put differently, should family law reflect national or state 
policies? The Elian Gonzalez situation provided a Rorschach test on 
this jurisdictional issue, regardless of the substantive controversies it 
sparked, with some finding a question of federal immigration policy 
in the inkblot and others discerning a child custody case that belongs 
in state family court.  
Fourth, the United States Supreme Court will hear arguments on 
the constitutionality of Nebraska’s so-called “partial birth abortion” 
ban.64 Although the focus on a particular abortion procedure might 
 
 60. The opinions recognize the variety of family forms prevalent today. See, e.g., 120 S. 
Ct. at 2059 (plurality opinion); id. at 2073 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2077 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 61. In United States v. Morrison , 120 U.S. 1740 (2000), a five-to-four decision handed 
down May 15, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act’s civil remedy for 
gender-based violence. The majority found the law exceeded Congress’ authority under both 
the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 62. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (interpreting narrowly the 
domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship). 
 63. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1911 (1995); Naomi R. Cahn , Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. 
REV. 1073 (1994); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995); 
Hasday, supra  note 4; Sylvia A. Law, Families and Federalism , 4 WASH . U. J.L. & POL’Y 175 
(2000); Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal 
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991). 
 64. In Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000), decided five-to-four on June 28, the 
Court held the law unconstitutional because it both failed to provide an exception for abortions 
necessary to preserve the woman’s health and imposed an undue burden on a woman’s ability 
to choose abortion. 
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appear to raise a new issue,65 in reality the question remains the same 
as always: To what extent can legislatures inject their own value 
judgments into women’s health care, second-guessing both the 
considered medical judgment of physicians and the choices of 
patients?66 
Indeed, medical discretion and the contributions of medicine to 
reproductive freedom have gained new importance in today’s world 
of assisted reproduction. Some of the greatest excitement in 
contemporary family law emerges from studying adoption law, first 
developed in the nineteenth century, side by side with modern 
alternatives to adoption, including in vitro fertilization and all 
variations of “surrogacy” arrangements.67 Medicine now permits so-
called “technological adoptions”68—with some authorities opining 
that today a child might have five parents69 and other authorities 
concluding that such children might lack even a single “parent” 
whom the law recognizes.70 The news here is not all good: What 
happens to children awaiting adoptive homes once prospective 
parents can buy the eggs and sperm of their dreams? To what extent 
do new reproductive options send the message that women really 
have no choice but to have children? 
The year 2000 brought the opportunity to revisit some earlier 
landmarks. The ERA is back in the news again, with talk that 
Missouri (surprise!) will take the lead in efforts to resume the 
ratification process.71 Utah is seeking new enforcement tools in its 
 
 65. But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-80 (1976) (invalidating a 
law prohibiting a particular abortion procedure, saline amniocentesis). 
 66. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Abortion: Who Decides Medical Questions? , ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, June 19, 2000, at B7 (op-ed). 
 67. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1129 (1998). 
 68. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET,  FAMILY BONDS:  ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
PARENTING 219 (1993). 
 69. See, e.g., LEE M. SILVER,  REMAKING EDEN:  HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND 
CLONING WILL T RANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 155-57 (1998). 
 70. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied , 
1998 Cal. LEXIS 3830 (Cal. June 10, 1998). Luanne Buzzanca and her husband contracted to 
have a child, Jaycee, with the help of donor egg, donor sperm, and a gestational surrogate. 
When the husband sought to disclaim responsibility upon divorce, the trial court ruled that 
Jaycee had no lawful parents. The court of appeal reversed, ruling the Buzzancas are Jaycee’s 
parents because, but for the arrangement they initiated, Jaycee would not have been born. 
 71. See Ellen Goodman, A Glimmer of Hope for the Dormant Equal Rights Amendment, 
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continuing effort to stamp out polygamy72 while the practice 
continues to flourish and contemporary “sister wives” debate whether 
polygamy exploits women or, instead, provides a feminist solution in 
the struggle to balance career and family.73  
Finally, 2000 unveiled the poignant denouement in the story of the 
boy who was raised as a girl. Published this year, a book recounting 
the child’s own experiences reveals that the earlier reports were all 
wrong.74 The attempted sex reassignment resulted in a hopelessly 
miserable childhood. When the child learned the truth at age fourteen, 
he felt enormous relief and quickly resumed a male identity. Despite 
the psychological scars, he now lives his life as a happily married 
man and adoptive father.  
This case emphasizes something my students from the early years, 
and even those from the most recent semester, must now know: How 
we approach all of the questions raised by family law requires 
continuous rethinking and reevaluation. Certainly, Lemma Barkeloo 
and Phoebe Couzins never imagined the transformation of the subject 
that Professor Reber presumably spent a few hours covering in his 
“spare time” in 1869. 
 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2000, at B7 (op-ed). See also Mason Kalfus, Comment, Why Time 
Limits on the Ratification of Constitutional Amendments Violate Article V, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
437 (1999). 
 72. Utah Senate Approves Bill to Fight Polygamist Crimes, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at 
A12; Utah Rejects Prosecutor for Polygamous Clans, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at § 1, 19. 
 73. Compare Greg Barrett, Polygamy Thrives; Utah May Consider Crackdown on Abuse, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 6, 2000, at A14; Katha Pollitt, Polymaritally Perverse:  Polygamy 
and its Relation to Same-Sex Marriages, THE NATION, OCT. 4, 1999, at  10, with Elizabeth 
Joseph, My Husband’s Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A15 (op-ed). 
 74. JOHN COLAPINTO, AS NATURE MADE HIM: THE BOY WHO WAS RAISED AS A GIRL 
(2000). 
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